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Abstract
Much of the resilience and ﬂexibility of production networks lies in the transparency of processes that allows timely perception of actual process
states and adequate decisions or intervention at the proper point of the production system. Such degree of observability and permeability do,
however, bear risks of malevolent tapping or interference with the information stream which, in the case of production systems, can put both
business and physical processes at risk, requiring careful exploration of security threats in horizontal and vertical integration, and individual
end-to-end connections likewise. Also, diﬀerent levels of networked production present speciﬁc needs—high throughput and low time lag on the
shop-ﬂoor level, or tolerances for conﬁdence, gambling and bounded-rational views in cross-company relations—that may conﬂict with security
policies. The paper presents a systematic summary of such apparently contradicting preferences, and possible approaches of reconciliation
currently perceived to be relevant on various abstraction levels of production networks.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientiﬁc committee of the Changeable, Agile, Reconﬁgurable & Virtual Production Conference.
Keywords: Production networks; process transparency; security; performance
1. Introduction
The past 1–2 decades have been marked by changes in indus-
trial production that can be attributed to the mutually ampliﬁed
tendencies of (1) changing consumer demands and environmen-
tal impact regulations requiring more eﬀort and faster adapta-
tion, and (2) the ability of the industry—at least, in a techni-
cal perspective—to address these evolving challenges. On one
hand, industrial production is, nowadays, required to be more
responsive to the diversity of demands (i. e., various degrees of
customization and additional services tailored to the individual
customer) and their quick changes (requiring tighter develop-
ment and lead times and more adaptivity). On the other hand,
eﬃcient use of resources is gaining importance in view of com-
petitive pressure and more stringent environmental regulations.
Dynamically changing production networks—as opposed
to ﬁxed supply chains, often centered around a single “ma-
jor player” determining long-term roles—proved to be a fea-
sible way of tackling the aforementioned challenges. Here,
participants of varying size, expertise and production capaci-
ties engage in collaboration, often on a project-by-project ba-
sis, to meet the perceived demands—not excluding the pos-
sibility of simultaneously acting as competitors in connection
with another production order. The emergence of such prod-
uct development and production structures is, to a decisive de-
gree, owing to greatly improved process transparency in design,
production and logistics, with observations or sharing trans-
actions often crossing both corporate and technological bor-
ders. This trend is individible from the development of theo-
retical foundations and applicable technologies putting the ob-
servability to use, often mentioned among characteristics of a
“fourth industrial revolution” [1–4]. The most signiﬁcant of
these are advances in handling “big data” and extracting use-
ful high-level information from large amounts of low-level and
unstructured data, modeling of processes and corresponding
measures of prediction and control, planning of mostly discrete
and structured aspects of production (e. g., scheduling and as-
signment problems), negotiation and contract mechanisms with
formal guarantees, and support for various forms of human
involvement (most signiﬁcantly, decision support and human-
comprehensible (re)presentation of underlying knowledge).
Such degree of process transparency and precise interven-
tion requires much more data to be collected, communicated
and stored than it was typical in earlier industrial practice, and
both the amount and the potential propagation of production-
related information present new challenges. Aside from inter-
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operability problems arising from the heterogeneous nature of
production networks, security and performance limits are the
two focal areas of concern. The paper gives a state-of-practice
review on problems and solutions applicable to production net-
works. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In section 2, we discuss common threats, countermeasures, and
limitations of state-of-practice security solutions. Section 3 re-
views contemporary solutions and trade-oﬀs. We conclude in
section 4 summarizing our main insights and identifying inter-
esting topics for further research. The areas of problems, limi-
tations and solutions reviewed in the paper are also summarized
in Figure 1.
2. Focal problems in production networks
As recent attacks on SCADA systems by dangerous malware
like Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Gauss [5,6] have shown, cyber-
security is a growing concern for production networks, as many
of the manufacturing systems in operation today were never de-
signed with networked production and large-scale machine-to-
machine connectivity in mind. This section reviews common
threats, countermeasures, and limitations of state-of-practice
solutions to secure production networks.
2.1. Common threats in networked production systems
Security threats and countermeasures in networked produc-
tion systems cover two areas of concern [7], i. e., (1) system se-
curity to protect the organization’s networks, software systems
and physical production facilities from disruption and denial-
of-service attacks, and (2) information security which deals
with defending information from unauthorized access, use, dis-
closure, tampering or destruction. With process transparency in
networked production as an emerging trend, the latter becomes
far more important and challenging.
Intercepting and injecting of information. An important secu-
rity threat deals with unauthorized access to information, ei-
ther through (1) circumventing authentication by spooﬁng one’s
identity using a legitimate user’s authentication credentials, or
(2) sidestepping access control with an elevation of privilege
attack where an unauthorized user (legitimate employee or at-
tacker) penetrates all system defenses to gain access to or alter
conﬁdential information. Such attacks can take place on data at
rest in a database (e. g., with an SQL injection attack [8]) or on
data in transit between two network production facilities with
an adversary executing a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack
(e. g., an SSL strip attack [9]).
With Cyber-Physical Systems gaining importance in net-
worked production, the attack surface grows with ample oppor-
tunities for an intruder not only to collect information from a
particular device or sensor, but also as a way to break into a sin-
gle node and move laterally across the trusted production net-
work [10] in order to tap into even more sensitive information
on customers, suppliers and commercial strategies [11]. Dis-
ruption of physical processes by taking control of actuators or
manipulating sensor data is also becoming an area of concern
in CPS [12–14].
Aggregation and inference attacks. Production transparency is
a key feature of Industry 4.0 [15]. Production assets will create
data that can be tracked, collected, and analyzed in real-time
across the organizational boundaries of the company. Hence,
there is the inherent risk of losing control over information
shared with partners in the value chain, and how they might
use and share that data [7] with competitors.
Beyond information security threats in such business-to-
business scenarios, there are also privacy concerns for the cus-
tomer. With just-in-time individualized production and man-
ufacturing, it is likely that the undesirable information disclo-
sure threats due to inference attacks in social networks [16] will
emerge in production networks as well. We expect that key
obligations of the upcoming EU General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) and technical compliance with such regulatory
frameworks [17] will have a signiﬁcant impact on networked
production.
Human decisions and social engineering. User behavior has
often been identiﬁed as playing a major role in security failures,
and that is why humans are usually considered the weakest link
in the security chain [18]. According to research from security
software ﬁrm Trend Micro [19], more than 90% of cyberattacks
begin with a spear phishing email, a form of phishing that uses
information about the target to make the attack more speciﬁc
and personal. Recent work by Krombholz [20] provides a tax-
onomy of well-known social engineering attacks.
While human behavior is often the weakest point in with-
holding conﬁdential information, it can also become a barrier
to disclosing information that is beneﬁcial to be shared—both
on the level of individual sharing decisions, and in setting up
sharing policies. This can be the result of a limited horizon
of knowledge regarding information handling processes in the
production network [21], eﬀecting that transparency is main-
tained in a limited range of participants only [22], or gambling
behavior is practised that deteriorates the overall eﬃciency of
cooperation [23,24].
2.2. Limits of countermeasures
Network intrusion detection systems and ﬁrewalls are fre-
quently used to detect a variety of malicious access patterns and
threats. Such countermeasures usually operate at the edge of
the organization’s network, and are suﬃcient to mitigate simple
security attacks. With networked production, the trust bound-
aries of the organization’s network continuously change, de-
manding for more dynamic solutions where access control is
pushed towards all elements in the production network. Nayak
et al. [25] proposed Reasonance, a system for securing enter-
prise networks where the elements in the network enforce dy-
namic access control policies based on both ﬂow-level infor-
mation and real-time alerts managed by OpenFlow [26] en-
abled switches. Much more challenging are advanced persis-
tent threats (APT) [27] where the objective of the intruder is
to achieve ongoing access without being detected. Such at-
tacks make use of sophisticated evasion techniques, malware
and other backdoors. They are usually not conducted to disrupt
the service and therefore more diﬃcult to detect. Mitigating
such threats require sophisticated anomaly detection algorithms
to identify unexpected information ﬂows.
Application-level weaknesses have been the cause of many
data breaches. For data at rest, encrypted databases [28] have
been proposed to handle SQL queries over encrypted data.
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Fig. 1. Summary of areas of problems, limitations and possible solutions referred to in the paper
However, recent work has shown that inference attacks are also
possible on encrypted database systems [29]. For data in tran-
sit, traﬃc analysis is a type of inference attack that intercepts
and analyzes messages to deduce information from patterns in
communication between production facilities, and encryption
usually helps to protect against such security threats. However,
work by Dryer et al. [30] has shown that traﬃc analysis is pos-
sible even on encrypted messages, hereby demonstrating that
state-of-practice countermeasures may fail.
Limits in bandwidth and computing power. In contemporary
production and manufacturing environments, industrial wire-
less networks of sensors, controllers and actuators are being
rolled out to realize intelligent monitoring, manufacturing and
control [31], albeit often without security measures in place to
protect against eavesdropping.
The primary reason for this security gap was the mainstream
belief that even lightweight cryptographic building blocks [32]
imposed a performance overhead that jeopardized their success-
ful application on resource constrained devices, such as passive
RFID tags. When applied, their implementation was sometimes
found inadequate in that the security protocols could be easily
broken [33]. However, the last couple of years, work is ongo-
ing on low-resource solutions [34] that make public-key cryp-
tography practical on passive RFID tags by means of highly
optimized hardware implementations.
Technological obsolescence. Last but not least, the increasing
pace of technological obsolescence [35] has an impact on net-
worked production. While new ﬁeld devices might be tech-
nically superior, it does not mean that current solutions are
functionally obsolete, even if they cannot be refurbished or up-
graded with new software to support the latest features. From
a managerial and system integration point of view, this means
security decisions become a cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ.
3. Solutions and trade-oﬀs
The scientiﬁc state-of-the-art has proposed several solu-
tions [25,36–39] that can be applied in the domain of produc-
tion networks. In this section, we will review such solutions
and discuss trade-oﬀs that decision makers are faced with on
how to maintain and secure their production infrastructure in a
cost-eﬀective manner.
3.1. Technological measures
Technological measures that are put in place in a networked
production environment should be the outcome of a rigorous
threat and risk assessment, for which existing process model-
ing frameworks such as STRIDE [40] and LINDDUN [41] can
assist with eliciting security and privacy threats.
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Special network architectures. Authentication and authoriza-
tion are typical features of an access control layer in an in-
formation security architecture. Solutions like Resonance [25]
implement dynamic network security policies in the network,
at devices and switches, leaving little responsibility to either
the hosts or higher layers of the network. This enables oper-
ators to specify how the network should control traﬃc when
network conditions change, such as in the case of a security
breach. Other in-network security systems and architectures are
NetSecu and LiveSec. NetSecu [38] is a collaborative network
security platform where security functions like ﬁrewalls, intru-
sion detection systems and anti-virus solutions can be dynam-
ically enabled, disabled and upgraded for each NetSecu node
at the edge of an access network. LiveSec [37] is a scalable
and ﬂexible security management architecture for large-scale
networks. Interactive policy enforcement checks various end-
to-end ﬂows for compliance against a global policy table that
identiﬁes which security service elements should be traversed.
Dynamic visualization of many real-time network events is an-
other key feature of this network architecture.
Trust brokers and third-party services. Due to similar perfor-
mance and scalability reasons, there is an emerging trend of
moving networked production and other business processes at
least partially to the cloud [31] to beneﬁt from scalable data pro-
cessing capabilities to improve the production and manufactur-
ing process. Such third-party cloud-oriented architectures oﬀer
value-added services to industrial cyber-physical systems, by
storing, integrating, aggregating and correlating data through
data mining, machine learning and statistical analysis. How-
ever, adequate security policies must be enforced such that the
trust boundaries across the organizations in the networked pro-
duction process are not broken—in some cases, surveillance of
these is also a part of third-party services, as in the auditing-
based approach by Bhargava et al. [7].
Improved policies in timing and relocating communication. In
production networks, much of the information can take several
alternative paths, and a considerable part of data is not required
to be forwarded immediately (as is the case, e. g., with low-level
production data to be aggregated on a day-by-day or shift-by-
shift basis for periodic forecasting or planning). Alternatives
either exist already, or can be taken in consideration at a rea-
sonably low overhead in design, development and operational
costs—these mean additional reserves in improving both per-
formance and security. Quantitative measures can be speciﬁed
to express the need for transmitting a given piece of information
by a given deadline, and communication timing can be evalu-
ated for fulﬁlling such criteria and constraints in view of re-
sources available in the network and in the individual devices
in question. Much research and development has recently taken
place for wireless sensor networks (WSN) where both network
and device resources are subject to limitations [42,43]. Similar
measures can be expressed for security aspects as well [44,45].
Examples in IoT middleware (see the frameworks in [44,46])
attest that such approaches are suitable for data exchange in
dynamically changing, often self-organized, environments with
timing and causality constraints that are also shared by produc-
tion environments.
3.2. Engineering and business decisions
Cross-company relations in production networks impose
speciﬁc needs that may conﬂict with security policies as well as
operational and economic aspects within the border of a single
company, such that ﬁnding the right balance between eﬃciency
and security of process transparency in production networks in-
volves important engineering and business decisions.
Assessing “suﬃcient” security levels. Even with growing cus-
tomization, quantities remain an important aspect of industrial
production, keeping economic feasibility in the focus for a wide
spectrum of decisions in building up, maintaining and operat-
ing production assets. Attacks motivated by gaining competi-
tive advantage underly similar considerations—in other words,
a proﬁt-motivated intruder is likely to attack if the balance of
advantages vs. eﬀorts seems to make this worthwhile. Game
theory [47–49] is often applied to estimate the likeliness of at-
tacks. All hierarchical levels of production networks have their
own typical patterns of data abstraction, frequency, and obso-
lescence, setting diﬀerent “break-even” points for a potential
attack. Having to maintain security with ﬁnite resources at
hand requires, therefore, a diﬀerentiated view at various layers
of production and business [50,51].
Detection and mitigation vs. prevention. As mentioned before,
industrial production, especially closer to the shop-ﬂoor level,
is likely to include “legacy” components, possibly without fea-
sible upgrade or retroﬁt of security-critical subsystems. Moder-
ate computational resources of embedded devices are also lim-
iting the attainable level of security [10]. Since de-facto vulner-
ability cannot be fully eliminated, the production system must
be prepared to detect and mitigate unavoidable attacks instead.
Such problems are, inherently, more pronounced in wireless
sensor networks, hence, much progress in this ﬁeld is stem-
ming from detection mechanisms and robust protocols applied
in WSN [52–54]. The development of cyber-physical produc-
tion systems (CPPS) led to the emergence of comparable coun-
termeasures for the conditions of industrial production, a part
of the methods exploiting the distributed nature of CPPS (e. g.,
swarm intelligence [55]) where components can observe and
attest each other’s function and communication using locally
available computational resources. Security in CPPS can be
critical due to possible access to actuators or interference with
control loops [12]—these threats are also addressed at the phys-
ical and control engineering level [13,14].
Information sharing as investment. Improved process trans-
parency is, to a given degree, binding for production networks
to function properly—still, sharing of information across cor-
porate boundaries is often hampered by the perceived risks and
costs of communicating more business information. In many
cases, the assessment of risks vs. beneﬁts is still biased by lack
of experience or insight into the nature of information sharing
in networked production. Formal methods of analysis of both
the sharing processes and related human perception can help es-
tablish a more sober and realistic view (see Wu et al. for supply
chains [56], and Prajogo et al. for parallels in long-term col-
laboration [57]), leading to regarding information sharing as a
form of investment weighed up against an expected return.
The distributed attacks of recent years have also shed light
on the importance of sharing information on detected threats.
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While this, too, requires careful assessment of what and how is
being shared, recent research has suggested beneﬁts [58,59].
4. Conclusion
The paper presented a systematic summary of apparently
contradicting preferences for process transparency versus se-
curity threat mitigation in production networks, and discussed
common security threats, countermeasures and their limita-
tions. While information sharing across corporate and tech-
nological borders does present security challenges, this is not
the only point of possible attcks. In many cases, weaknesses
persist even within corporate borders due to the spreading of
networked production architectures in lower hierarchical lev-
els that continue to deploy weakly protected legacy compo-
nents. Also, human decisions and user behavior based on lim-
ited knowledge horizon can be both a potential point of security
breach, as well as an obstacle to (adequately planned) sharing
of production and business information.
The paper considered concrete network architectures, poli-
cies and technical measures, as well as trade-oﬀs in a cost vs.
beneﬁt perspective as possible approaches of improvement and
reconciliation of conﬂicting preferences. The overview of cur-
rent practices and trends was found to convey the following key
messages: (1) It is reasonable to expect that in production net-
works and participating companies, policies and infrastructure
continue to be shaped by both technical and economical “com-
mon sense”, as well as prevailing beliefs, inherently keeping
some weak points. Therefore, detection and mitigation of un-
avoidable attacks, as well as development of robust solutions at
various hierarchical levels continues to be important. (2) Much
research is being conducted in modeling information sharing
and attack phenomena. These investigations are likely to gain
importance as they contribute to the proper understanding of the
underlying problems—both in the context of the given level of
production processes, as well as in an integrated perspective of
larger entities—and enable the development of analysis and de-
cision support tools. (3) With information sharing and transac-
tions often crossing both corporate and technological borders, a
holistic approach is needed towards dynamically managing the
end-to-end security chain while oﬀering the necessary ﬂexibil-
ity to adapt business and production processes to continuously
evolving trust boundaries between and across organizations.
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